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Abstract 
Many policy networks are characterized by belief-oriented segregation, where actors with shared belief systems are clustered 
together and few opportunities exist for communication across coalitions of like-minded stakeholders. This inhibits the ability of 
network actors to effectively learn about, and successfully manage, complex policy problems. Despite the importance of 
understanding why these structures emerge, the processes that generate belief polarization in networks are not well-studied. This 
paper derives a general agent-based model of network formation and belief change from the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF), a prominent theory of the policy process that has been widely applied to the study of belief conflict in contentious policy 
systems. Simulation results suggest that the ACF assumption of biased information processing plays a critical role in the 
emergence of belief-oriented segregation in networks. This model provides a starting point for re-thinking the role of cognitive 
bias in social and policy learning, as well as the relationships between belief change and the evolving structure of policy 
networks. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Networks are a crucial part of the machinery of political decision-making, and the structure of networks can yield 
insights into the rationales that drive cooperation within a particular policy domain (Henry et al., 2010). In addition, 
network structures have a direct influence on the ability of actors to collectively solve problems that are highly 
complex and involve large amounts of potentially value-laden scientific information (Hong and Page, 2004; Dietz & 
Henry, 2008). While some treatments of networks surrounding a particular policy issue—termed “policy networks” 
in this research—assume that network formation is an intrinsically desirable goal, the structure of many policy 
networks hinder problem solving processes by creating barriers between two or more groups of actors who must 
share information or otherwise interact in order to gain traction on a issue (Burt, 2004). One important structural 
barrier is network segregation, a term used to describe networks that exhibit two related properties: first, network 
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actors are grouped into two or more “clusters” or “communities” with dense interactions within groups and 
relatively sparse connections between groups (Girvan & Newman, 2002), and second, actors have attributes that are 
strongly correlated with membership in a given cluster.1
Network segregation is of great applied interest, since this property may inhibit actors’ ability to deal effectively 
with shared problems. For example, research in sustainability frequently points to the challenges in learning and 
collective action that are posed by schisms within networks across vertical and horizontal levels of government 
(Schneider et al., 2003), between the scientific and policy-making communities (Cash et al., 2003; McNie, 2007), 
and (perhaps the most daunting barrier of all) across groups with divergent belief systems regarding the scope and 
severity of problems and appropriate solutions (Henry, 2009). The focus of this paper is to model the emergence of 
this latter type of segregation—termed belief-oriented network segregation—within policy networks. 
Belief-oriented network segregation is a feature observed within many networks (e.g., Henry et al., 2010; Weible 
& Sabatier, 2005), and is thought to greatly exacerbate political conflict as it limits lines of communication and trust 
between actors with divergent viewpoints on policy. What is less well-known about this phenomenon, however, is 
the process by which it emerges. This research uses agent-based computer simulation to model hypothesized 
pathways to belief-oriented segregation in policy networks, based on theoretically-grounded expectations of how 
network actors engage in social learning (i.e., assimilate specific beliefs from others within their network 
neighborhood), and how actors’ networking decisions (i.e., with whom they form network ties) are in turn 
influenced by their belief systems. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF: Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999) is chosen as a theoretical 
starting point for defining a general class of agent-based models. The ACF is chosen for two reasons. First, the ACF 
is a prominent theory of the policy process that has been widely applied to the study of belief conflict in a wide 
variety of policy arenas, and the ACF focuses on the behavior of individuals embedded within segregated network 
structures. Second, the framework includes an explicit conceptual model of belief systems, networking, and social 
learning that is amenable to mathematical formalization and computer simulation. Given the lack of comprehensive 
theory in the social sciences regarding the interactions between learning processes, internal belief system structure, 
and networks (Henry, 2009), the ACF is a good starting point for the operationalization and testing of theoretical 
propositions. 
The agent-based models developed here include parameters that represent assumptions regarding the endogenous 
formation of network linkages and social learning processes. The general model allows for various specifications 
that are consistent with the ACF, but that tweak the strength of the framework’s assumptions regarding network 
formation and belief change processes. In addition, competing models may also be specified. These models are then 
run using initial network structures that are well-mixed, in the sense that they are unsegregated and exhibit belief 
heterogeneity. Hypothetical agents are then allowed to learn from one another and rewire their network 
neighborhood over time, until equilibrium is reached in network actors’ belief systems. This allows for a direct 
investigation of whether models implied by the ACF are capable of producing belief-oriented network segregation, 
and in addition allows for an investigation of the relative importance of different theoretical assumptions. 
2. Networks, social learning, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF provides one of the more sophisticated treatments of belief systems, social learning, and network 
formation in the policy process literature (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999). The ACF contains a clearly-
explained set of theoretical foundations that imply a particular model of belief change and network formation, 
leading to the emergence of what the ACF calls “advocacy coalitions” (see, for example, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1999). Advocacy coalitions are defined in the ACF as groups of actors who both coordinate their political behavior 
and also share an integrated set of policy-relevant beliefs. Thus, networks that contain two or more advocacy 
1
 The concept of network segregation is related to community structure, however community structure indicates a property of the network 
structure only whereas network segregation imposes the additional requirement that actor attributes be homogenous within communities and 
heterogeneous across communities. 
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coalitions also exhibit belief-oriented segregation; network clusters correspond to advocacy coalitions, and belief 
systems tend to be homogenous within each cluster but quite different across clusters. While the ACF focuses on 
political elites, this model is also applicable to understanding ideological polarization within the general public—
this is also an important area of research (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008).  
The ACF explains the emergence of advocacy coalitions and belief-oriented segregation through a process 
known as “biased assimilation.” Biased assimilation has been studied by social psychologists for a number of years, 
and assumes that policy actors tend to systematically filter information through their prior beliefs and discredit 
information that is not congruent with their belief system (Innes, 1978; Lord et al., 1979; Munro & Ditto, 1997; 
Munro et al., 2002). Since policy actors with shared beliefs have similar perceptual filters, information exchange, 
learning, and the development of common views occurs easily among them. Conversely, shared learning is 
exceedingly difficult between people with conflicting beliefs, since their perceptual filters will cause them to 
interpret the same piece of evidence differently. This breeds mistrust among people with conflicting beliefs, and 
causes networks to form and solidify among those with shared perceptual filters. 
Thus, biased assimilation influences social learning and network evolution in two ways. The first is that the ease 
with which two actors are able to learn from each other is directly related to their similarity in beliefs. Second, 
biased assimilation further constrains learning processes by influencing where policy actors go to gather information 
and discuss policy issues. These effects are further compounded by a “devil shift” phenomenon that causes actors to 
emphasize the negative attributes of their competitors, which further inhibits the formation of ties between actors 
with divergent beliefs (Sabatier et al., 1987). 
In modeling these processes, it is important to note that the architecture of a belief system will, in most cases, be 
quite complex. Not only are many different types of beliefs likely to influence networking decisions, but some 
beliefs are likely to be constrained or influenced by other beliefs. For example, beliefs that lack a strong empirical 
component (such as beliefs regarding the appropriate tradeoffs between environmental and economic sustainability 
in development decisions) may influence an actor’s interpretation of more specific, evidence-based beliefs (such as 
the reliability of certain economic indicators). The ACF provides a method of defining policy-relevant beliefs for a 
particular policy subsystem by categorizing beliefs into a three-tier hierarchy comprised of the “deep core,” the 
“policy core,” and “secondary aspects.”  Deep-core beliefs are broad normative values that act as a general guide for 
political behavior, and are normally applicable to a wide variety of policy subsystems. The policy core includes 
basic strategies and beliefs concerning a specialized policy area, which are usually subsystem-wide in scope. 
Secondary aspects include specific policy rules and preferences that are constrained by the policy core, and are more 
narrow in geographic scope than either deep-core or policy-core beliefs.2
3. Overview of the model 
The consequences of the ACF’s behavioural assumptions of belief change and networking are explored via an 
agent-based model of social learning in an evolving network. This model is built upon a prior model of belief 
change on a static social network described in Henry (2007). The model is written and implemented in the statistical 
computing package R (R Core Development Team, 2006), and visualizations make use of the “sna” package written 
for R (Butts, 2006). 
In the model developed here, hypothetical policy actors are allowed to interact and learn within a dynamically-
changing policy network. The term “learning” is here used interchangeably with the terms “social learning” and 
“social influence,” which (as noted above) is defined as change in an agent’s beliefs based on the beliefs of 
surrounding agents. The assumption here is that policy actors are engaged in a continual process of discussion, 
persuasion, and adjustment of their own beliefs based on information received from their network partners (i.e., 
those they are connected to within the network). The most important feature of this simulation is that learning 
2
 This research uses the ACF convention of labeling these cognitive elements “beliefs,” although it should be noted that the usage of terms 
varies considerably across literatures. For example, cognitions such as values, attitudes, and certain types of norms also fit well into the ACF 
hierarchy of beliefs. 
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processes are constrained by the underlying network structure, which governs opportunities of agents to 
communicate and learn from one another. This network, in turn, evolves dynamically as beliefs are updated and 
agents reassess their cognitive similarities and differences with others in the system. 
The following discussion provides an overview of the two main components of the model: how agents’ belief 
systems are structured, and how agents update their network ties. 
3.1. Social influence: A simple model of belief systems 
The model begins by populating a policy system with a fixed number of agents, N, each of whom is assigned a 
static “core” belief that may be used to filter evidence or arguments received from the surrounding social 
environment. This core belief is represented by the variable c, where ci represents the core belief of the ith agent. 
Core beliefs are assumed to be discrete, nominal variables that take on one of two values, say –1 or 1 (the model 
dynamics are independent of how c is represented numerically). In the models presented here, the system is assumed 
to contain a total of 50 interacting agents (N = 50), with a uniform distribution of competing values of ci in the 
population (thus, 25 agents have one level of ci and the other 25 agents have a different level of ci). Agents are 
represented graphically as nodes, where the shape of the node (circle or triangle) represents their corresponding 
value of ci. 
Dynamically-changing beliefs are represented by a continuous variable b, ranging in the interval [–1, 1], where bi
represents the policy belief of the ith agent. Representing bi as a continuous variable allows for the modelling of 
beliefs with varying intensity—in this model, bi values close to zero are meant to denote more moderate beliefs 
whereas beliefs further from zero are more extreme. Moreover, the valence of bi also represents competing belief 
orientations in the population. In the initialization of agent beliefs, ci is causally prior to bi, where negative values of 
ci will tend to correspond with negative values of bi and vice versa. Thus, bi takes on a bimodal distribution in the 
population, where negative and positive values tend to reflect the competing deep- and policy-core belief 
orientations that exist in the policy system. 
According to the ACF, belief-oriented segregation usually occurs on the basis of policy-core beliefs, and so it is 
perhaps most appropriate to think of the dynamic belief b as the policy core, and the core belief c as the belief type 
that filters and influences the policy core; namely, the deep core. In this case, the model is useful for illustrating the 
circumstances under which policy core beliefs solidify within advocacy coalitions. On the other hand, one could also 
investigate whether (and under what conditions) network segregation takes place on secondary aspects (b) by 
viewing the policy core beliefs (c) as static over time and the primary filter on more specific secondary beliefs. Both 
approaches are consistent with the ACF’s theoretical expectations, and illustrate how this model may be used to test 
(and more concretely operationalize) the ACF’s hypothesized dynamics of learning and coalition formation. 
Agent beliefs are visualized through the shape, colour, and size of nodes, as represented in Figure 1. Node shapes 
represent values of ci—in this case, agents are either represented as circles (ci = +1) or triangles (ci = –1). Note that, 
since ci is static, node shapes will never change throughout the course of a simulation. The valence of bi is 
represented by node colour: red is used to denote positive values of bi and green is used to denote negative values of 
bi. Since bi is distributed as a function of ci, in the initial conditions circles will tend to be red and triangles will tend 
to be green, although this will not always be the case. Finally, node size reflects the intensity of the belief bi, where 
smaller nodes have bi close to zero and larger nodes have correspondingly larger absolute values of bi. 
                                          Positive; close to zero.               Negative; far from zero. 
Figure 1: Visualization of agents’ belief systems. Numbers in the center of nodes denote values of bi. 
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3.2. Social influence: How beliefs are learned 
At each time step, all agents are given an opportunity to update their beliefs based on information received from 
agents with whom they are connected in the network (more details on how this network is structured are given 
below). Agents learn sequentially, where agents are selected at random to learn from their neighbours until all actors 
have updated their beliefs. Thus, learning occurs at the level of egocentric networks. When an agent is selected to 
learn, they become Ego while adjacent agents (actors who have a link to Ego) become persuading agents. Ego has d
persuading agents, where d is the degree of Ego’s vertex, that is, the number of other agents with whom Ego shares 
a direct connection. 
Before Ego interacts with her d persuading agents, she has belief bi = BE. Each persuading agent simultaneously 
attempts to convince Ego to update her beliefs to be in closer agreement with that of the persuader. Ego then learns 
from all of these persuading agents by balancing the competing forces of persuasion and choosing an actual belief 
change, ǻBE. 
In the example illustrated in Figure 2, Ego is being persuaded by 5 actors, each of whom wants Ego to adopt 
their belief. While none of the persuading agents agree entirely with Ego, two of them (PA2 and PA4) share Ego’s 
underlying belief orientation, since all of their belief scores are positive. The belief orientations of the other three 
persuading agents are in competition with Ego’s orientation. In Figure 2, note that node size does not represent 
belief intensity. 
In choosing ǻBE, Ego first determines the belief change that would best balance out the competing forces of the 
ideologically-diverse persuading agents. If Ego is a rational information processor, then this is done by simply 
averaging out the belief change that each persuading agent is pressuring Ego to undertake. Thus, in the rational case, 
d
Bb
d
i
Ei¦
=
−
=Δ 1E
)(
(max)B .    (1) 
Ego does not, however, have a diffuse prior about the correct belief to adopt. Rather, these persuasive forces 
must also be balanced by Ego’s prior belief (BE). Thus, this “optimal” belief change (given the persuasive forces of 
Ego’s adjacent agents) represents an upper bound of change rather than an actual change to be undertaken. The next 
step taken by Ego is to choose, uniformly and at random, an actual belief change ǻBE that lies between zero and 
ǻBE(max), inclusive. In the above example, 
5
)2.01()2.01()2.07.0()2.05.0()2.05.0((max)BE
−−+−+−−+−+−−
=Δ , or 
Figure 2: An example of Ego interacting with five persuading agents. 
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)2.1()8.0()9.0()3.0()7.0((max)BE
−++−++−
=Δ , or 
34.0(max)BE −=Δ . 
Thus, Ego chooses a random actual belief change to adopt such that her new belief, BE’, lies somewhere 
between her initial belief BE and the belief that averages out the competing persuasive forces, BE + ǻBE(max): 
[ ] [ ]14.0,2.0(max)BB ,B EEE −=Δ+∈′EB . 
In this case, there is nearly a 50% chance that ego will shift her underlying belief orientation, from red to green. 
This is not only because a majority of her persuading agents have competing belief orientations, but also because 
she began with a fairly moderate belief score. 
3.3. Social influence: Incorporating biased assimilation
The above specification of learning processes assumes that each agent will give equal weight to the competing 
beliefs of all other adjacent agents. But what if agents are susceptible to biased assimilation, as the ACF suggests?  
In this case, Ego will give disproportionate weight—or even a polarizing weight—to persuading agents who share 
her core beliefs. Conversely, the arguments of persuading agents with competing core beliefs will be perceived as 
less influential, and will have a comparatively weak effect in Ego’s learning process. 
To capture the effect of biased assimilation, consider a new model parameter called the biased assimilation 
index, denoted ȕ. This index may take on any value between –1 and 1 (inclusive), and depending on the value of ȕ
Ego may be a rational learner as described above (where all agents are given equal weight), Ego may give 
diminishing weights to forces exerted by agents with different values of ci, or forces from persuading agents with 
different levels of ci may cause Ego’s beliefs to polarize away from the persuading agents’ bi values.  
To incorporate the role of biased assimilation in the model, Equation 1 is reformulated into a more general form: 
d
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d
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−⋅
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(max)B
β
,    (2) 
where ββ =i  if iego cc ≠ , and 
where 1=iβ  if iego cc = . 
Thus, when ȕ = 1 we have the rational learning scenario described above. When ȕ lies in the interval [0,1), Ego 
will give smaller weight to persuading agents with differing levels of ci, where values of ȕ closer to zero indicate 
diminishing weights. When ȕ is negative, then ideological forces from persuading agents with different underlying ci
orientations will cause Ego to choose beliefs that move away from her persuading agents. 
It should be noted that these ȕi weights are a function of similarity in core beliefs, and can be viewed as the 
degree to which Ego devalues information received from a persuading alter with a competing core belief. It is 
plausible, of course, that agents’ valuation of information from certain sources is also a function of other actor 
attributes, such as qualifications, history of providing useful policy information, or disciplinary identity. It is 
possible that some of these influences could be modelled within the current framework. For instance, by viewing the 
core variable c as an indicator of whether an agent is a scientist or a political decision-maker, ȕ could then be used to 
model communication difficulties between scientific and decision-making communities, or the degree to which 
members of each community devalue information received from outside their community. Other types of influences 
could be directly specified, but at the cost of increasing model complexity. 
To illustrate how these weights influence the learning process, consider once again the Ego from our above 
example (see Figure 2). How would we revise our estimates of her potential belief change if biased assimilation 
were at work?  Suppose, for example, that ȕ = 0.8. Then,  
20   Adam Douglas Henry /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  22 ( 2011 )  14 – 25 
5
)2.1)(8.0()8.0)(1()9.0)(8.0()3.0)(1()7.0)(8.0((max)BE
−++−++−
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Thus, under biased assimilation, Ego will choose: 
[ ]028.0,2.0 −∈′EB . 
The likelihood that Ego will shift her underlying orientation from positive (red) to negative (green) is now very 
small, despite the fact that a majority of her persuading agents are green. Disproportionate weight has been given to 
the arguments of the red minority. 
3.4. Network formation: Initial conditions 
At this point it is clear that the dynamic process of belief change depends largely on the underlying structure of 
the network. Many agent-based models assume very simple types of lattice networks (e.g., Axelrod, 1997, Johnson 
& Huckfeldt, 2005), and in many cases these structures do not change during the course of a simulation. However, 
more recent work demonstrates that equilibrium conditions can change radically when different assumptions are 
made about underlying network structures (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). Thus, a key point of departure is to make a 
decision about what the underlying network should look like. 
This model assumes that, in the initial conditions, agents are connected with each other in an Erdös-Renyi 
random graph, as depicted in Figure 3. Specifying an initial network requires a single parameter p; to create the 
initial network, each dyad (possible actor pair) is independently populated with a single network link with 
probability p, and not populated with a link with probability 1 – p. Density of the network is proportional to p. Note 
also that this method of specifying an initial network assumes no correlation between agents’ belief systems and the 
existence of linkages between them; thus the simulations are able to explore whether agents will begin to sort 
themselves into advocacy coalitions as they learn and rewire their surrounding network. 
Using a random graph in the initial condition allows us to consider many types of network structures as a starting 
point. Even though many realistic structures, such as power-law graphs, will be realized with extremely low 
probability, the use of random graphs allows for a stochastic starting point that controls for initial network topology 
over many distinct simulation runs. This is an advantage over approaches that always use the same network (such as 
a lattice structure) without introducing any random perturbations of that initial structure. Nonetheless, future 
elaborations of this model should consider alternative types of random initial networks. 
Figure 3: An initial, unsegregated network. This network includes 50 agents linked in a random graph with expected density 0.15. 
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3.5. Network formation: The rewiring process 
After agents are given an opportunity to update their beliefs, they are given the opportunity to rewire their local 
network. According to the ACF, this occurs primarily through a process of aversion from dissimilar alters due to 
biased assimilation and the devil shift—the process of link formation, on the other hand, is not clearly explained 
within the framework. Although ACF scholars generally assume that tie formation occurs through an attraction to 
others with shared belief systems, the model outlined here assumes that new partners are chosen uniformly at 
random. This yields a more conservative view on how coalitions are potentially formed through the network 
rewiring process, and restricts our focus only to these theoretical processes that are made explicit within the ACF. 
All network rewiring is performed simultaneously by all agents. The probability that any given tie is deleted is 
governed by a new model parameter Į, which takes on a value in the interval [0,1]. Smaller values of Į indicate that 
agents are subject to only a small bias towards cutting ties with ideologically-dissimilar network partners; larger 
values correspond with larger probabilities of tie deletion when two agents have divergent beliefs. 
Let D(i,j) denote the probability that the link connecting agents i and j will be deleted. Then, 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
−=
− ji bbe
jiD 11),( α .     (3) 
Thus, large differences in the b values of two connected agents corresponds to a high probability that the tie will 
be deleted—however, this effect is attenuated or even negated if alpha is close to zero. 
Each agent simultaneously assesses their existing links with other agents in the network, and terminates each link 
with probability D(i,j). Each link is therefore subject to termination twice—once by each agent connected in the 
relationship. Deleted relationships are then rewired by the agent that terminated the link, who selects a new network 
partner uniformly at random from the set of all agents who lie outside of their network neighbourhood. Note that it 
is possible in this process for a tie to be deleted and subsequently reformed; this is a rare occurrence, however, and 
will not influence the main results presented here.
4. Simulation runs 
Approximately 1,000 simulations were run under different initial values of p, yielding initial networks with 
expected densities ranging from about 0.05 (very sparse networks) to about 0.25 (fairly dense networks). For each 
level of p, simulations were run across the full range of possible Į and ȕ values, which allows for an exploratory test 
of the ACF model of learning and coalition formation. For any given combination of Į and ȕ, several separate 
simulations were run to check the stability of equilibrium conditions. 
Each simulation was run to convergence. Model convergence is assumed to occur at time t if the maximum belief 
change (in absolute value terms) for any agent between time steps t–1 and t does not exceed 0.005. This ensures that 
no substantial amount of belief change is likely to occur, although the simulation will never stabilize completely due 
to the randomness built into the learning and network rewiring processes. 
4.1. Summary statistics 
There are a number of key features of interest that may be used as a starting point to summarize and assess 
simulation results. What follows is a brief description of these features, and how they will be empirically identified 
in networks that have run to convergence. 
4.1.1. Network segregation and ideological rift 
The primary result of interest is whether or not model runs with a given set of input parameters tend to produce 
belief-oriented network segregation as described within the ACF. We are thus interested in the extent to which 
agents’ beliefs have converged to a state where beliefs are relatively similar within communities of shared levels of 
the core belief, c, and different across communities of actors with competing values of c. This ideological 
polarization across densely connected network clusters is captured by a statistic called “ideological rift.”  In order 
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for ideological rift to be positive, we must have a convergence state where mean belief scores in each community 
are different, and there exists little or no overlap between agent belief scores across differing core beliefs. 
Suppose that b1 is the mean belief score for agents with core belief ci = 1, and b2 is the mean belief score for 
agents with core belief ci = –1. The standard deviation of beliefs within each group is given by ı1 and ı2, 
respectively. Then ideological rift, denoted R, is given by: 
R = b1 − b2 − (σ1 +σ2).    (4) 
Ideological rift is a continuous measure that identifies the presence or absence of belief-oriented segregation, and 
reflects the intensity of the aggregated ideological conflict between advocacy coalitions.3
4.1.2. Ideological consensus 
An alternative to ideological polarization is a convergence state where roughly all agents share the same belief. 
The degree of ideological consensus that exists in the entire network is measured simply by the variance of all 
agents’ beliefs. Variance scores approaching zero indicate ideological consensus, whereas increasing variance in 
beliefs indicate decreasing consensus. 
This parameter may be summarized by ideological rift: when ideological rift is close to zero, the degree of 
ideological consensus in the network is high. 
4.1.3. Ideological heterogeneity 
When ideological rift is large, we have network segregation. When ideological rift is close to zero, we have 
consensus. When ideological rift is strongly negative, we have “ideological heterogeneity.” Ideological 
heterogeneity suggests that consensus does not exist within the network, however the network also does not exhibit 
belief segregation. As noted above, this situation represents a state where there is significant overlap in beliefs 
across communities, but variance in beliefs across the network as a whole remains large. 
3
 Ideological rift is positive when there is no overlap within one standard deviation of the mean belief score in each partition. To see where the 
equation comes from, suppose that bH is the larger mean belief score for the two communities, and bL is the smaller mean belief score. The 
standard deviation of beliefs within each community is given by ıH and ıL, respectively, then ideological rift is given by: R  = (bH - ıH) – (bL + ıL) 
= (bH - bL) – (ıH + ıL) = | b1 – b2 | - (ı1 + ı2). 
Figure 4: Ideological rift for selected ȕ > 0 and varying levels of Į. The x-axes represent increasing levels of Į (from 0 to 1); y-axes represents 
levels of ideological rift in the convergent state.
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5. Simulation results 
Simulations reveal that the emergence of belief-oriented segregation is very sensitive to assumptions regarding 
the degree to which policy actors are rational information processors. Generally speaking, it is difficult to model the 
emergence of ideological polarization when agents are not biased assimilators; on the other hand, biased 
assimilation seems to be an important driver of both coalition formation and the persistence of existing coalitions. 
5.1. The role of alpha 
The degree of belief homophily at work (parameter Į) seems to have a negligible influence on ideological rift 
when actors are assumed to give even small weight to persuading agents with competing core beliefs. On the other 
hand, when agents with competing core beliefs are discounted (when ȕ is small), higher values of Į may exacerbate 
belief-oriented segregation, yielding higher ideological rift values. Figure 4 illustrates this result; it displays a scatter 
plot of Į values against ideological rift, for ȕ levels from 0.2 to 1.0, in 0.2-point increments. Recall that the learning 
processes represented in these scatter plots are rational, in the sense that individual actors will use information from 
all persuading agents to update their beliefs, although for smaller levels of ȕ smaller weights are given to ideological 
forces from agents with differing core beliefs (ci). However, the key here is that competing beliefs will still converge 
towards global consensus, as illustrated by ideological rift values that are close to zero in almost all cases. 
This is a surprising result. It demonstrates the importance of diffusion processes in balancing, even dominating, 
network-rewiring forces that move a network towards clustering around segregated communities. In the case of 
small ȕ parameters, diffusion may be slow but nonetheless still leads to states of ideological convergence states in 
the long run. Indeed, the primary difference between model runs with small but positive ȕ values, and models 
without biased assimilation (ȕ = 1), is that smaller values of ȕ lead to longer convergence times. 
5.2. Beta and the emergence of belief-oriented segregation 
In order to model the emergence of networks where agents sort themselves into belief-oriented coalitions, it is 
essential to have at least some degree of belief polarization at work (i.e., ȕ < 0). In nearly all simulation runs using 
negative ȕ parameters, convergent networks were characterized by positive ideological rift values. Figure 5 displays 
two representative networks obtained when negative ȕ values are assumed. 
This pattern of clear belief-oriented network segregation is observed consistently across simulation runs, when 
ideological forces from agents with divergent core beliefs cause polarization rather than some degree of consensus. 
These patterns lend strong support for the ACF view that biased assimilation is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of advocacy coalitions. 
The far right panel of Figure 5 provides further evidence of the importance of biased assimilation in driving 
ideological rift. In this scatterplot, positive ȕ values (no biased assimilation) tend to yield ideological consensus in 
convergent networks, whereas negative ȕ values consistently yield positive ideological rift and, in many cases, 
extreme belief polarization within networks. While some of the variance in ideological rift for negative values of ȕ
may be explained by Į, the interactions between Į and ȕ are clearly overshadowed by the direct influence that biased 
assimilation has in structuring polarized networks.
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents a simplified first analysis of a simulation results from an agent-based model of learning that 
incorporates a model of co-evolving beliefs and policy network structures. This paper operationalizes a general 
learning model that is consistent with the ACF. While the ACF model of learning has been subject to extensive 
theoretical development and some empirical testing, this is one of the first studies to directly test these models 
within a dynamic framework. Although agent-based models such as this will need to be coupled in the future with 
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empirical data on policy networks, the results illustrate conceptually the importance of considering both network 
dynamics along with cognitive biases in understanding why segregated networks emerge and persist over time. 
Findings support the core ACF hypothesis, that biased assimilation—or a polarization in beliefs when individuals 
with competing “core” values or beliefs exchange information—is an important driver of polarization in networks. 
Surprisingly, the degree to which policy actors seek to avoid communication with dissimilar actors is much less 
important than the learning processes that govern how beliefs are diffused within a policy network. 
The dynamics of the model outlined here depend on only two parameters. This boosts tractability and 
generalizability, but on the other hand also leaves room for building in greater realism. One possible elaboration is 
to provide agents with feedback that signals whether their beliefs are correct. As it stands, this model is perhaps 
appropriate for modeling belief change in policy realms characterized by high levels of uncertainty and/or prominent 
systems of normative beliefs. But it will be important to also understand how groups of agents may also come to 
solve complex problems and arrive at the “correct” or “optimal” policy solutions. 
Ultimately, this is all about decision-making. Within the ACF, as well as in other frameworks, decisions are made 
where there must be some degree of consensus. This could be the adoption of a policy or agreement to stay with a 
quota for commons harvesting. The question then becomes, what are the dynamics by which subsystem actors come 
to a consensus?  When do they remain divided, or even become more polarized?  This paper helps us move towards 
explicit models of these processes, emphasizing in particular the importance of co-evolutionary models of network 
change and social learning. These formal models will then enable us to explore the types of institutional 
arrangements that may help to promote consensus in the face of complex policy problems, either by intervening in 
the structure of policy networks or through arrangements that attenuate the negative effects of biased assimilation. 
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